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The Fatimid army was the land force of the Fatimid Caliphate (909–1171). Like the other armies of the medieval Islamic world, it was a multi-ethnic army, drawn from marginal and even foreign peoples, rather than the Arabs mainstream of Fatimid society. The core of the Fatimid army emerged from the Berbers Kutama tribe, who had accepted the Isma'ili propaganda of Abu Abdallah al-Shi'i and overthrown the Aghlabids of Ifriqiya between 902 and 909. Very quickly the Kutama were supplemented with other ethnic contingents, such as the (Byzantine Greeks) and the (Black Africans), inherited from the Aghlabid military, but the Berbers remained the mainstay of Fatimid armies until the 970s, when the Fatimid conquest of Egypt and their subsequent expansion into Bilad al-Sham brought them into conflict with the Turkic peoples cavalry of the eastern Islamic world. The Fatimids began to incorporate Turks and Daylamites in large numbers into their army, which led to—often bloody—rivalry with the Kutama. The Turks enjoyed an almost absolute ascendancy during the chaotic years 1062–1073, when the Fatimid regime almost collapsed during the Mustansirite Hardship. Their regime was ended by the Armenian Badr al-Jamali, who instituted a quasi-military dictatorship under the guise of an all-powerful vizierate, which effectively reduced the Fatimid caliphs to puppets. Under Badr and his successors, the Armenians rose to prominence in state and army, and during the final century of the Fatimid state it was them and the who provided the bulk of the Fatimid armies, until their power was broken by Saladin in the Battle of the Blacks in 1169.
The fighting record of the Fatimid army was mixed. It began as a quasi-revolutionary force during its early decades, when it was marked by indiscipline and tribal rivalries, which resulted in the failure of the first attempts to conquer Egypt. As the Fatimid regime consolidated itself, however, the army's quality improved, and during the conflicts of the 950s in North Africa and against the Byzantine Empire in Sicily, it performed well. The conquest of Egypt in 969, a watershed moment in the Fatimid Caliphate's history, was a political rather than a military triumph, and the subsequent advance into the Levant brought the Fatimid military to face with enemies—the Turks, the Qarmatians, and the Byzantines—that it struggled to defeat. During the crisis of the mid-11th century, the military became the real power brokers in the Fatimid state, culminating in the rise of Badr al-Jamali. During the Crusades, the Fatimid army again performed unsatisfactorily: while large and relatively strong on paper, it repeatedly failed to defeat the Crusaders, and by the end of the Fatimid regime it had become the object of derision among its Christian and Muslim enemies alike. When Saladin took power in Egypt and abolished the Fatimid dynasty, he almost completely disbanded the Fatimid army; very few Fatimid troops were taken over into the armies of Saladin's Ayyubid Sultanate.
Following the model common in the Islamic world, the army was administered by a special fiscal bureau (), the 'department for the armies and recruitment' (). The government was also responsible for providing the troops with additional weaponry—often bought at the open market in Cairo—as well as horses and pack animals; Caliph al-Aziz is said to have maintained a stable of 12,000 horses and 36,000 camels for the purpose. During the first years of Caliph al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (), salaries were paid eight times a year, but by al-Mustansir Billah's time () this had changed to monthly payments, which was the system retained until the end of the Fatimid state. Like the Abbasids before them, the Fatimids also awarded land grants () to their troops for their upkeep. Under al-Hakim, such grants were made even to ordinary soldiers. Bedouin tribes also received , but usually these were chosen among the less productive lands, and had to be supplemented by a monetary stipend. While regular soldiers were allocated individual grants (), Bedouin companies were allocated collective s.
The economic problems that began in the late 10th century meant that the troops were sometimes left unpaid, leading to indiscipline and protests by the soldiers: the army rioted and ransacked Cairo in 1024, and in 1036, one of the exasperated soldiers threw a javelin that just missed killing al-Mustansir. The military's dissatisfaction over lack of pay was the main reason for the anarchy between 1062, which led to the virtual disintegration of both army and country, that lasted until the rise to power of Badr al-Jamali in 1073. Many soldiers resorted to farming their estates when plagues killed much of the peasantry in the mid-11th century. As in other areas of the Muslim world using the system, it led to deteriorating quality of land, and after Badr al-Jamali came to power, he engaged in reforms aiming to address the problem.
While previously the bulk of the army had been paid salaries directly from the , Badr al-Jamali's reforms generalized the use of for the upkeep of the soldiers. Most of the revenue from an still went to the state, but its recipient () was still entitled to a fixed stipend () from it. Unlike the contemporary Seljuk Empire model, the did not hold administrative powers over his grant. Nevertheless, the reform bound the soldiers to the land, and inaugurated a system that survived into the Mamluk Sultanate.
Several commanders are known to have raised and maintained armed retinues from these estates, and to have used them as normal troops on campaign.
The officer corps (s or s, ) were divided into three grades, distinguished by dress, according to the size of their commands: the highest-ranked wore golden collars ( or ), the next held silver batons (), and the lesser commanders () had no distinctive insignia. The existence of sub-units of the ethnic contingents is known, but no details on the distinction between the various titles or their responsibilities survives. In the 11th century, each ethnic contingent apparently had an auditor (), often a member of the caliphal secretariat, who was responsible for mediating between the unit and the caliph.
The most senior Fatimid commander was usually the commander-in-chief of the army in Syria, who bore the title of ('commander of commanders') or ('commander of the armies'). The latter title was borne by Badr al-Jamali when he came to power, and henceforth designated the quasi-dictatorial viziers who ruled the Fatimid state almost without interruption until its end.
Despite the high prestige of the Turkish cavalry, during the 11th century the bulk of the Fatimid field armies remained infantry, with the cavalry (usually augmented by Bedouin tribesmen), positioned on the flanks.
During the late Fatimid period, more conservative figures are given: the 14th-century Egyptian historian al-Maqrizi quotes an account by the head of the , Ibn Mammati, that during the vizierate of Tala'i ibn Ruzzik (1154–1161), the army comprised 40,000 cavalry and 30,000 Black African infantry. At another point, however, referring to the same account, al-Maqrizi writes of 40,000 cavalry, 36,000 infantry, and 10,000 marines on ten galleys. These figures too are considered implausible by modern scholars, even if they are interpreted to include auxiliary forces and volunteers; as the historian Yaacov Lev points out, particularly the high ratio of cavalry to infantry is implausible, as is the ratio of 1,000 marines to one galley. Much more plausible are the figures given elsewhere by al-Maqrizi, referring to the late 1160s, during Shirkuh's arrival in Egypt: 10,000 cavalry, 40,0000 Black African infantry, and 10,000 marines and troops.
On the other hand, this dominion of the semi-civilized Kutama was greatly resented, not only by the other Berber tribes, but chiefly by the inhabitants of the cities, where the Arabic culture predominated. As Halm writes, the situation was similar to a scenario where, "in the early eighteenth-century North America, the Iroquois, converted to Catholicism by Jesuit missionaries, had overrun the Puritan provinces of New England, installed their chieftains as governors in Boston, Providence and Hartford, and proclaimed a European with dubious credentials as King of England". Inevitably, the arrogance and exactions of the Kutama led to rebellions in the newly conquered Fatimid domains, in which the Kutama particularly were singled out and killed by the rebels. During the early Fatimid invasions of Egypt, the Kutama-based Fatimid army also suffered from indiscipline.
After the move of the seat of the caliphate to Egypt in 973, a large number of Kutama accompanied the dynasty east, while the Sanhaja, under the leadership of the Zirid dynasty, were left behind to uphold Fatimid authority and the Isma'ili doctrine in Ifriqiya. Rather superficially converted amidst a largely Sunni population, the Sanhaja and the Zirids were unable (or unwilling) to prevent the resurgence of Sunnism, the massacre of the Isma'ili communities of Ifriqiya in 1016/7, and the eventual break of the Zirid dynasty from even nominal recognition of Fatimid overlordship during the 11th century.
However, the forays into the Levant in the 970s revealed the inadequacies of an army based solely on the Kutama, and from 978, the Fatimids began incorporating ethnic groups, notably the Turks and Daylamites, from the eastern Islamic lands into their army. In combination with the increasing difficulty of renewing their pool of Kutama recruits after , these events challenged the hitherto dominant position of the Kutama in the army. Thereafter, a fierce rivalry developed between the Kutama and the 'Easterners' (). In 996, on the accession of al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, the Kutama refused to acknowledge the new caliph unless the Kutama leader al-Hasan ibn Ammar was appointed as vizier. This was done but Ibn Ammar's blatantly pro-Berber regime quickly alienated other members of the elite, and he was overthrown a year later. Finally, when al-Hakim assumed the reins of government in 1000, he launched a purge of the Fatimid elites, during which Ibn Ammar and many of the other prominent Kutama were executed.
Thereafter the position of the Kutama steadily declined, so that in November 1025, during an official review, the once numerous and proud Kutama were reduced to demanding bread to sate their hunger. Shortly after, they were unable to mobilize even 100 horsemen at short notice. On the other hand, the Persian traveller Nasir Khusraw mentions that there were 20,000 Kutama horsemen during his visit to Egypt in 1047. During the chaos of the years 1062–1073, the Kutama allied themselves with the against the Turks and the Daylamites. The last remnants of the Kutama were dismissed from the Fatimid army after Badr al-Jamali came to power in 1073.
Other Berber groups attested in the Fatimid army were the or ('the Champions'), who participated in the conquest of Egypt and had a quarter of their own in Cairo. Nasir Khusraw reported seeing 15,000 horsemen during a military review in Cairo. The were another group of Berber origin (from Barqa) which is first mentioned as part of Jawhar's army.
The last major Berber regiment are the , recruited from the High Atlas. They are stated to have been first recruited under al-Aziz Billah, but only appear in the sources in the mid-11th century, in the account of Nasir Khusraw. They numbered 20,000 infantry armed with spear and sword, and were often used to garrison cities in Syria. They apparently survived the regime of Badr al-Jamali, since they reappear briefly during the vizierate of al-Ma'mun al-Bata'ihi (1121–1125).
A similar group in many respects were the ('Slavs', sing. ), a term frequently applied to European slaves in Islamic lands, but not tied to a specific ethnic or regional origin. The were also extensively used by the Aghlabids, and were inherited by the Fatimids, who used them in their military, court, and administration. The provided many of the court eunuchs that were entrusted with high offices and military commands, particularly under Caliph al-Mu'izz. Such were the chamberlain Jawdhar, Sabir al-Fata, who led naval raids against the Italian coasts, the eunuch general Qaysar, the general Muzaffar, and even Jawhar, the conqueror of Egypt. Barjawan, the quasi-dictator in 996–1000, may also have been one of them.
The enjoyed the peak of their prominence in the late 10th century. They too moved to Egypt with Jawhar, and a lane in Cairo was named after them. More were inherited from the Ikhshidids after the conquest of Egypt, and in 974/5, Caliph al-Mu'izz bought all privately owned . As the Hamdanid dynasty of Aleppo declined during the late 10th century, many of their were also taken over into Fatimid service, while the Iberian Peninsula proved a major source of new recruits.
While the are mentioned in records as forming a distinct contingent of the Fatimid army, their role is obscure, and most of their members mentioned in the sources are associated with administrative or courtly functions rather than as soldiers. With the arrival of the Turks, they began to lose their prominent position, but remained favoured for the prestigious court function of (bearer of the , likely a sort of parasol and one of the chief regalia of the Abbasid and Fatimid caliphs), a position that ranked fourth in the administrative hierarchy of the Fatimid state.
The are still mentioned as a distinct palace corps in 1024/5, but by Nasir Khusraw's time a generation later they appear to have been replaced by the black and white palace eunuchs (s).
However black troops were heavily used by the previous Egyptian regimes of the Ikhshidids and Tulunids, and the conquest of the county opened a more direct way of recruitment via the kingdoms to the south of Egypt. Under Caliph al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (), the corps was greatly expanded, as the Caliph bought up black slaves in large numbers, setting them free and taking them into his service. Black slaves are thus mentioned during the Revolt of Tyre (996–998).
A number of distinct corps were apparently formed from the : the , the , the , and especially al-Hakim's sword-armed personal guard, the . The were sufficiently prominent that Byzantine envoys visiting the court brought gifts specifically for them, but in 1005 al-Hakim suddenly, for reasons unknown, purged the unit, killing its commander and half of its 100 men.
The influx of black soldiers upset the balance with the other groups, as well as relations with the civilian population, who were exposed to plundering and even killings at the hands of the . Al-Hakim put officers of the in command of the Turks in a deliberate move to humiliate the latter for their unruliness; the result was a major battle between the two groups in February/March 1020. On occasion, the also joined with other military corps in looting the markets, or assaulting the non-Muslim population of Cairo. This unruliness continued during the reign of al-Zahir (), particularly as the economic crisis hit the army and diminished both its fighting ability and its discipline. The situation was so bad, that the were reportedly reduced to eating dogs, as they did not receive any pay; repeated riots and mutinies are recorded for the years 1024–25. Nevertheless, they remained quite numerous: Nasir Khusraw mentions 30,000 , but also 20,000 —Berbers from the western Maghreb, but Nasir Khusraw calls them black—and a further 30,000 Zanj (blacks from East Africa), who do not appear in any other source.
After Badr al-Jamali's rise to power, the existing black regiments were disbanded as too loyal to the caliph, although Badr did raise a personal guard of black troops. After the death of Badr, the blacks became the mainstay of the Fatimid army, and remained loyal to the dynasty to the end, trying unsuccessfully to revolt against Saladin when the latter's intention to depose the Fatimids became clear, in the so-called "Battle of the Blacks". Defeated, the black troops were driven out of Cairo into the country, hunted down and killed. This removed the last support of the Fatimid dynasty and left Saladin as the undisputed master of Egypt.
The Zuwayla are first mentioned during the second Fatimid invasion of Egypt, where captured Zuwayla executed by the Abbasid authorities alongside captured Kutama soldiers. When al-Mahdi Billah founded a new palace city at Mahdiya, they provided part of its garrison, and the extramural suburb where they lived became known as Zawila after them.
The Zuwayla came to Egypt in Jawhar's army and were assigned a special quarter in Cairo; the Bab Zuwayla gate was also named after them. They appear in a list of military units as late as 1004/5, but thereafter vanish from the sources. The reason is unknown; they may have been disbanded, or the supply of fresh recruits stagnated and the unit lost its importance.
According to Lev, "the Turks were given a privileged position and special bonds of patronage tied them to the regime". They had their own quarter, not in Cairo but in Fustat, and married local women. They are mentioned in the riots of the 1020s, fighting against the Black Africans and the Berbers. During the chaos of 1062–1073, the Turks emerged as the virtual rulers of the capital, until they were overthrown by Badr al-Jamali. They disappear thereafter, although some attempts, apparently not very successful, were made to reintroduce them to confront the Crusaders.
The Daylamites (), a mountain people from northern Iran, were a common source of soldiers for a number of Islamic potentates already since the 9th century. In Egypt they were closely allied to the Turks, as they entered service in the same circumstances, after Alptakin's defeat; they and the Turks shared a quarter in the capital. In 1024, the Daylamites are attested as a separate regiment, but Nasir Khusraw attests that "the Turks and Persians are collectively called the ". Nasir Khusraw also mentions that during his visit, he saw 300 Daylamites on foot escorting the caliph armed with axes and the (the characteristic Daylamite javelin or short spear).
Along with the Black Africans, the Armenians opposed Saladin, but were defeated during the "Battle of the Blacks", massacred, and their possessions confiscated.
The major shift in the armament of the Fatimid armies came about as a result of their confrontation with the heavily armoured Turks of Alptakin in Syria in the 970s, which in short order led to the introduction of Turkish and Daylamite troops into the Fatimid army. Heavy cavalry, where both the rider and the horse were armoured with chainmail, are a regular feature of Fatimid armies after that point. Although a large variety of weapons is attested during the 12th century, both the infantry and the cavalry retained the javelin and the sword as their principal armaments. Weapons were produced in special state-controlled workshops, but were also imported from abroad.
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